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Abstract
We investigated the relations between numeracy and superior judgment and decision making in two large community
outreach studies in Holland (n=5408). In these very highly educated samples (e.g., 30–50% held graduate degrees),
the Berlin Numeracy Test was a robust predictor of financial, medical, and metacognitive task performance (i.e., lotteries,
intertemporal choice, denominator neglect, and confidence judgments), independent of education, gender, age, and another
numeracy assessment. Metacognitive processes partially mediated the link between numeracy and superior performance.
More numerate participants performed better because they deliberated more during decision making and more accurately
evaluated their judgments (e.g., less overconfidence). Results suggest that well-designed numeracy tests tend to be robust
predictors of superior judgment and decision making because they simultaneously assess (1) mathematical competency
and (2) metacognitive and self-regulated learning skills.
Keywords: numeracy, risk literacy, individual differences, cognitive abilities, superior decision making, judgment bias,
metacognition, confidence, dual systems.
1 Introduction
Statistical numeracy—i.e., one’s practical understanding
of probabilistic and statistical problem solving—is one
of the strongest domain-general predictors of superior
judgment and decision making in both numerical and
non-numerical tasks (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, &
Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Kut-
ner, Greenberg, Jin, & Paulsen, 2006; Lipkus & Peters,
2009; Peters, 2012; Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al.,
2006; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). Nu-
meracy also tends to be a substantial independent predic-
tor of superior performance when compared with tests of
fluid intelligence, cognitive reflection, and attentional con-
trol (Cokely et al., 2012; Låg, Bauger, Liberali, Reyna,
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Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Lindberg, & Friborg, 2013;
Schapira et al., 2012; Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz,
Burns, & Peters, 2013).1 Research indicates that the link
between numeracy and superior decision making does not
primarily reflect differences in abstract reasoning or neo-
classically normative decision strategies.2 Instead, nu-
meracy’s predictive power often reflects differences in (1)
heuristic-based deliberation (e.g., deep elaborative pro-
cessing, Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Cokely et al., 2012); (2)
affective numerical intuition (e.g., precise symbolic num-
ber mapping, Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006); and (3)
meaningful intuitive understanding (e.g., gist-based rep-
resentation and reasoning; Reyna, 2004, 2012; Reyna &
Brainerd, 2005b; Reyna et al., 2009).
There are now many established and newer numeracy
tests validated for use with diverse samples (e.g., the “Nu-
meracy Understanding in Medicine Instrument” (NUMi)
for older-adult patient samples; Schapira et al., 2012).
However, most numeracy tests are not appropriate for the
1Some innovative research shows that executive functions can out-
predict numeracy under some conditions (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bru-
ine de Bruin, 2012; Del Missier, Mäntylä, Hansson, Bruine de Bruin,
& Parker, 2013). However, as noted by the authors (see also Cokely et
al., 2012), highly sensitive numeracy tests were not yet widely available
and could not be used in these studies. Related replication and extension
studies are currently ongoing in our laboratory.
2Although numeracy tends to predict superior performance, numer-
acy is also positively correlated with some non-normative biases. See
Peters et al. (2006) for the seminal example of numeracy’s link with
heuristic processes that can give rise to both normatively superior and
inferior judgment and decision making. See Cokely and Kelley (2009)
for a cognitive process tracing study detailing qualitative and quantitative
differences in heuristic search and elaborative encoding.
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measurement of statistical numeracy in highly educated
participants such as professionals working in medicine
and finance (for a review of available numeracy tests see
Cokely, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2013, in press). One
exception is the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT), which has
been found to provide superior psychometric sensitivity
in moderate to very highly numerate participants (e.g.,
college students, professionals, computer literate adults;
Cokely et al., 2012). Accordingly, we build on previ-
ous research investigating the mechanisms, robustness,
and generalizability of numeracy by examining the per-
formance of two very highly educated community sam-
ples on a small set of paradigmatic judgment and decision
making tasks. We begin with a literature review provid-
ing an overview of some of the notable findings and nu-
meracy assessment tools that are now available. We then
present results of two new studies conducted as part of our
RiskLiteracy.org outreach efforts (e.g., a study included
in a newspaper report about the importance of statistics
for decision making). We conclude with a discussion of
the links between numeracy, metacognition, and superior
judgment and decision making.
1.1 Numeracy
Experts do not agree on an exact and uncontroversial theo-
retical definition of mathematics. Fortunately, quantitative
skills are easier to operationalize and measure. For more
than 50 years, researchers have studied the causes and
consequences of numeracy (Huff & Geis, 1954; Paulos,
1988), including extensive longitudinal studies conducted
in large diverse samples such as the National Assessment
of Adult Literacy (NAAL; Kutner et al., 2006) and the Pro-
gram for International Student Assessment (PISA; OECD,
2012). There is wide agreement that the theoretical con-
struct of “numeracy” is not synonymous with pure mathe-
matical skill but instead refers to mathematical or quantita-
tive literacy (Steen, 1990; see also Nelson, Reyna, Fager-
lin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008, and Reyna et al., 2009), re-
flecting an emphasis on “mathematics in context” as de-
scribed in the US Common Core State Standards Initia-
tives. Specifically, the construct “numeracy” refers to the
“array of mathematically related proficiencies that are evi-
dent in adults’ lives . . . including a connection to context,
purpose, or use. . . for active participation in the demo-
cratic process and. . . in the global economy” (Ginsburg,
Manly, & Schmitt, 2006). At the more basic levels, numer-
acy involves the “real number line, time, measurement,
and estimation” whereas higher levels focus on an “under-
standing of ratio concepts, notably fractions, proportions,
percentages, and probabilities” (Reyna et al., 2009).
Within the decision sciences, efforts to understand and
measure numeracy involve both subjective and perfor-
mance assessments. For example, one validated subjective
assessment of numeracy often used in health and medical
domains asks participants eight questions in which they
judge their personal levels of numeracy (e.g., “How good
are you at working with fractions;” Fagerlin et al, 2007;
Zikmund-Fisher, Smith, Ubel, & Fagerlin, 2007; and for
subjective graph literacy see Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, &
Ghazal, 2014b). Several studies indicate moderate-to-
high correlations between objective and subjective mea-
sures (Fagerlin et al., 2007; Liberali et al., 2012; Weller
et al., 2013; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2007). Studies fur-
ther show the subjective test can provide unique predictive
power beyond intelligence test scores (Låg et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, other research indicates that people can be
highly overconfidence in reporting their subjective numer-
ical ability. For example, Sheridan, Pignone, and Lewis
(2003) showed that 70% of subjects reported that they con-
sider themselves to be “good with numbers”, while only
2% of those respondents correctly answered three objec-
tive numeracy questions (see also Dunning, Heath, & Suls,
2004).3
Performance based numeracy assessments are the most
commonly used methods in the allied decision sciences.
The longest-standing and most widely used assessments of
numeracy are based on classical testing theory, which es-
timates theoretical differences in abilities based on one’s
relative test score (Novick, 1966; see also Cokely et al.,
2013, in press; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Peters et
al., 2006; Schapira, Walker, & Sedivy, 2009; Schwartz et
al., 1997). To illustrate, in 1997, Schwartz et al. (1997)
conducted a seminal randomized cross-sectional numer-
acy study investigating the relations between numeracy
and relative risk perceptions. Five hundred women were
initially mailed the study stimuli and asked to partici-
pate. Respondents included 287 mostly older adult women
(mean age 68 years) who were veterans with modest in-
comes (e.g., less than $25,000 per year). The majority
of participants had also completed high school (96%) and
about a third had completed at least some college. Nu-
meracy was assessed with three items that were similar to
and based on items used in the NAAL survey (see previ-
ous section). Once scored, these items were used to pre-
dict the women’s understanding of data presented in one
of four formats (e.g., relative risk reduction versus abso-
lute risk reduction with baseline). The women were asked
to interpret the material provided and to report on the
risks/benefits of mammography screening (e.g., “Imagine
1000 women exactly like you. Of these women what is
your best guess about how many will die from breast can-
cer during the next 10 years if they are not screened ev-
ery year for breast cancer?”). Results indicated that about
3The three items were from the test by Schwartz et al. (1997). These
results suggest that subjective instruments are likely best suited for spe-
cific purposes, including rapid, rough numeracy assessment among peo-
ple who have some math anxiety.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2014 Numeracy and biases in the highly educated 17
half of the women (i.e., 54%) accurately answered two
questions, while only 20% accurately answered all three
(i.e., most could not convert 1 in 1000 to 0.1%). As ex-
pected, results also revealed a moderate positive correla-
tion between participants’ final score and their relative risk
reduction interpretations, providing evidence of decision-
related criterion validity for the brief assessment.
The results of Schwartz et al. (1997) and the subse-
quent results provided by Lipkus et al. (2001) were timely
for a number of reasons (for reviews see Cokely et al.,
2012, in press).4 First, the results provided additional evi-
dence that among community samples in the United States
some sizable proportion of individuals were likely to be
statistically innumerate (e.g., 20% failed questions deal-
ing with risk magnitude), a result that accords with find-
ings from the NALS and NAALS National Surveys. Such
findings are important, as many efforts designed to sup-
port informed and shared decision making rest on an as-
sumption that decision-makers are numerate (or at least
sufficiently statistically numerate; see also Edwards & El-
wyn, 2009, and Guadagnoli & Ward, 1998). Second, re-
sults indicated that domain framing (e.g., medical, finan-
cial, or abstract gambles) did not tend to affect test per-
formance or comprehension. This finding indicates that
various domain-specific items (e.g., items framed in terms
of financial, medical or gambling risks) can provide a rea-
sonable basis for the assessment of domain-general statis-
tical numeracy skills, although it is theoretically possible
that domain familiarity will confer some additional deci-
sion performance advantages (Levy, Ubel, Dillard, Weir,
& Fagerlin, 2014).
1.2 Advances in numeracy assessment
After more than a decade of research using classical tests
of numeracy, research in the decision sciences has turned
to modern psychometric testing paradigms—i.e., Item Re-
sponse Theory (IRT) and its variants. In contrast to classi-
cal testing theory, item response theory requires modeling
of probabilistic distributions over test taker’s responses to
specific items. The focus of test development is on the
item rather than on the pooled responses to items as in
classical testing theory. A full description of the theory is
beyond the scope of this paper (see Lord, 1980; Van der
Linden & Hambleton, 1997); however, it is useful to note
that IRT tests improve predictive performance by eliminat-
ing item redundancy with estimated parameters including
item difficulty (e.g., how hard is any particular item for
a given trait level), discrimination (e.g., how sharply and
4There are also a number of performance measures of numeracy that
assess one’s approximate number system—a related but independent the-
oretical construct. For a recent example of these tests see Lindskog, Win-
man, and Juslin (2013).
consistently does an item distinguish individuals at higher
versus lower trait levels), and guessing (e.g., true/false
items will be guessed correctly 50% of the time). To il-
lustrate, Schapira et al. (2012) developed the Numeracy
Understanding in Medicine Instrument (NUMi) to pro-
vide a higher-fidelity assessment of basic health numer-
acy among less educated patient samples. The 20 item
test was developed using a two parameter IRT approach
integrating four numeracy sub-skills (e.g., graph literacy,
statistical numeracy). Results reveal that the NUMi test is
robust and provides good psychometric sensitivity that is
suitable for use with less numerate individuals (e.g., older
adult patient samples). Results also provided evidence of
construct validity and unique predictive power (e.g., inde-
pendent of the predictions of general intelligence tests).
Using a Rasch analysis, which is akin to a one param-
eter IRT-type approach, Weller et al. (2013) developed an
eight item numeracy measure optimized for use with the
general population of the United States. Test development
involved comparison of 18 items taken from existing mea-
sures of numeracy and a cognitive reflection test. Specifi-
cally, items were drawn from tests developed by Lipkus et
al. (2001) (which includes the items of Schwartz et al.,
1997), and tests developed by Peters et al. (2007), and
Frederick (2005). The resulting scale provides greatly im-
proved psychometric discriminability when used with the
general population of the United States. Evidence also
indicates that the test provides stronger predictive valid-
ity for risk judgments (i.e., Låg et al., 2013; Lipkus et
al., 2001). Despite these notable improvements, one lim-
itation of the Weller et al. (2013) abbreviated numeracy
scale, as well as the test items analyzed by Låg and col-
leagues (2013), is that they combine two distinct types of
test items with differential ranges of sensitivity to improve
psychometric sensitivity of the numeracy assessments. In
particular, they include: (1) some relatively difficult items
designed to measure cognitive impulsivity/reflection (i.e.,
the CRT by Frederick, 2005) and (2) some relatively easy
items designed to measure statistical numeracy.5
5Although confirmatory factor analysis has indicated that the con-
structs can be considered one factor, there is reason to be cautious with
this interpretation. The two types of items have been found to dissoci-
ate in theoretically notable ways, differentially predicting financial judg-
ments, reasoning, and risk comprehension (Cokely et al., 2012; Cokely,
Parpart, & Schooler, 2009; Di-Girolamo, Harrison, Lau, & Swarthout,
2014; Låg et al., 2013; Liberali et al., 2012). Recent results also indicate
the two types of items can load on different factors (Liberali et al., 2011)
and that statistical numeracy alone can capture all reliable variance asso-
ciated with the CRT in some tasks involving highly educated individuals
(Låg et al., 2013). Differences in item type are also responsible for dif-
ferences in psychometric discrimination at different ranges (e.g., CRT
items are harder and numeracy items are easier; Låg et al., 2013; Weller
et al., 2013).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2014 Numeracy and biases in the highly educated 18
1.3 The Berlin Numeracy Test
Building on the work of Lipkus et al. (2001) and Schwartz
et al. (1997), Cokely and colleagues (2012) developed a
fast psychometric test of differences in statistical numer-
acy among educated samples of adults living in diverse in-
dustrialized countries (e.g., college students, working pro-
fessionals, and computer literate adults). The test was cre-
ated using new statistical numeracy items selected from a
large pool of candidate items. All items were subjected
to think aloud protocol analysis to control for potential
confounds from factors such as linguistic confusion. The
test was then developed using a decision tree application
from the predictive modeling software DTREG (Sherrod,
2003). The analysis yielded several versions of the test
(see http://www.RiskLiteracy.org for links and test format
recommendation tools), including (i) the adaptive test that
adjusts item difficulty based on a test-takers previous re-
sponses (2–3 items; about 2.5 minutes duration) and (ii)
a traditional 4 item paper-and-pencil test (4 items; < 5
minutes duration). Psychometrically the decision tree’s
assessment approximates an item response theory analy-
sis identifying items with high levels of discriminability
across a specified range of item difficulty, with a guessing
parameter of zero.
The construct validity, reliability, and psychometric
sensitivity of the Berlin Numeracy Test was initially es-
tablished in 21 studies (n=5336) of participants from 15
countries including assessments of diverse groups (e.g.,
US medical professionals, community samples, Mechan-
ical Turk web-panels). Validation studies have since
been extended to participants from 60 countries and in-
clude several patient and physician samples from all over
the world (Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Ghazal, 2014a;
Garcia-Retamero, Wicki, Cokely, & Hanson, in press).
Initial and subsequent analyses indicate that the test of-
fers robust sensitivity, with optimal performance among
those who have some college education.6 The test was
also found to be the strongest predictor of understanding
everyday risks (e.g., evaluating claims about products and
treatments; interpreting forecasts), doubling the predictive
power of other numeracy instruments and accounting for
unique variance beyond other cognitive tests (e.g., cogni-
tive reflection, working memory, intelligence).
The BNT has been validated for the prediction of risk
literacy (e.g., accurate interpretation and comprehension
of everyday risks). However, relatively few studies have
investigated the relationship between performance on the
test and in other types of tasks measuring superior perfor-
mance (for some related examples see Di-Girolamo et al.,
2014; Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, Wicki, & Hanson, 2014;
Riege & Teigen, 2013; Woller-Carter, Okan, Cokely, &
6Sensitivity was poorest among students at an elite university in
China. About 75% of those participants answered all questions correctly.
Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Theoretically, the test should
predict performance across the same wide range of do-
mains as other numeracy tests (e.g., the correlation with
the test by Schwartz et al., 1997 is around .5). However,
unlike other numeracy tests, the BNT is designed to pro-
vide greater psychometric sensitivity among moderate-to-
very-highly numerate individuals, such as highly educated
participants and professionals. Nevertheless, there could
be some threshold level of mathematical skill wherein
decision-makers are competent enough to accurately inter-
pret and perform all requisite calculations present in judg-
ment and decision task stimuli. In the same way reading
ability becomes less predictive of performance once one
has achieved college level reading proficiency, numeracy’s
predictive power may wane or fail among very highly ed-
ucated participants because they’re all numerate enough.
To investigate issues in psychometric sensitivity and pre-
dictive validity, along with an examination of some key
underlying cognitive mechanisms, we conducted a series
of two large studies of paradigmatic judgment and deci-
sion making tasks in very highly educated samples from
the Netherlands.
1.4 Experimenting with public outreach
In 2012, following the publication of the Berlin Numer-
acy Test and the launch of www.RiskLiteracy.org, we were
contacted by a journalist working for de Volkskrant—a
national daily morning newspaper in Holland.7 He was
interested in details of the BNT for an article about the
importance of statistics for decision making. Rather than
include a direct link to RiskLiteracy.org, we asked if we
could create a unique link to an experiment that would
be included in the newspaper article. Along with allow-
ing for the collection of data, the link would provide users
with immediate feedback on their relative numeracy lev-
els (e.g., an estimate of their overall risk literacy). Ulti-
mately, with support from editors, technical support, in-
ternal review boards, etc., we created a brief online study
that newspaper readers could participate in, hosted on the
de Volkskrant website (ca. 5–8 minutes long). In turn, we
provided participants with feedback on their initial perfor-
mance (i.e., immediate feedback on their Berlin Numer-
acy Test scores) and later provided a general summary of
results included in a second follow-up newspaper article
along with additional learning resources.
At a later date, we were invited to take part in the Grand
National Numeracy Survey in the Netherlands.8 Again,
one constraint was that our study needed to be very brief
7We thank Hans van Maanen, editors, and technical support at de
Volkskrant.
8We thank Han van der Maas, Marthe Straatemeire, and other col-
leagues and participating researchers with the Grand National Numeracy
Survey.
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Table 1: Demographic data on reported occupation and
education level in Study 1. Data represented as propor-
tions.
Education
Occupation (proportion) College degree Masters/PhD
Banking/Finance .04 .66 .41
Statistics/Math. .06 .92 .73
Computer/Engineer. .17 .78 .54
Humanities /Art .05 .85 .68
Medicine/Health .12 .86 .68
Management/Admin. .12 .74 .49
Customer services .01 .46 .24
Students .08 .57 .34
Others .36 .69 .47
and include the Berlin Numeracy Test with performance
feedback. For both studies, we selected paradigmatic
judgment and decision criterion tasks based on previous
research. Each task was selected to provide a small but
representative window (1–2 items) into central topics in
judgment and decision making, presented either in the
context of finance (i.e., gain/loss lotteries and intertem-
poral choice) or medicine/health (evaluating clinical trials
with differing group sizes; subjective confidence in judg-
ment). We also collected data on decision latencies using a
relatively insensitive but convenient response time metric
(i.e., how long was the internet window open during finan-
cial decisions). Study 2 (Dutch National Numeracy Sur-
vey) provided a replication and extension of Study 1 (de
Volkskrant) in which participants completed all the same
tasks and also completed the numeracy test by Schwartz
et al. (1997).
2 Study one: de Volkskrant newspa-
per study
2.1 Participants
About 4500 visitors responded to the newspaper article
presented in de Volkskrant in 2012. After removing partic-
ipants who did not complete the entire study, the final data
set used for analysis included 3990 respondents, 64% of
whom were male. The mean participant age was 48 years
(SD = 13.5). Demographic data on reported education and
occupational fields are presented in Table 1.
2.2 Materials, procedures, and hypotheses
All materials were presented in Dutch.9 Data were col-
lected using online survey software (unipark.de) with re-
cruitment via a link hosted on the de Volkskrant website,
which was included in both online and print versions of a
newspaper article. Upon logging onto the website, partic-
ipants were redirected to the online survey on the secure
unipark server and were subsequently presented with an
approved electronic informed consent for review and ap-
proval. Next participants read brief instructions and com-
pleted an adaptive version of the Berlin Numeracy Test,
wherein participants were asked 2–3 questions that were
selected based on the accuracy of their previous answers
(i.e., correct answers led to harder questions, incorrect an-
swers led to easier questions).
Participants were next presented with three tasks in
a financial context on a new website page. Two ques-
tions were simple lotteries taken from previous research
(Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; see Appendix
A). For example, participants were asked whether they
would prefer +/−C100 for certain or 75% chance of
+/−C200 (i.e., in either gain or loss frame; see Appendix
A for all material). The two lotteries were systematically
counterbalanced and presented in randomized order (e.g.,
gain first, loss first). The third question on the page was
an intertemporal choice that has previously been shown to
track individual differences in cognitive reflection (Fred-
erick, 2005), namely, “which option would you prefer:
C3400 this month or C3800 next month”. Overall, we
hypothesized that more numerate participants would make
more normatively superior choices, showing smaller fram-
ing effects (i.e., approximating expected value) and pre-
ferring more normative discounting rates. Consistent with
previous findings (Cokely & Kelley, 2009), we predicted
that total decision latency on the website page featuring all
three questions (i.e., a rough proxy for total deliberation)
would be related to numeracy and superior performance.
We further hypothesized that decision latency would par-
tially mediate the relationship between the Berlin Numer-
acy Test and superior financial decision making.
For tasks in the medical context, we presented a mod-
ified medical scenario known to be associated with de-
nominator neglect, taken from Okan, Garcia-Retamero,
Cokely, & Maldonado (2012; see also Garcia-Retamero
& Galesic, 2009).10 Participants were asked to rate the
effectiveness of a drug based on fictional results of a clini-
9We thank Dafina Petrova and several colleagues at de Volkskrant for
facilitating translation of the informed consent and basic test materials.
The BNT translation employed in Cokely et al. (2012) was used in this
study.
10We did not assess judgment latencies because both the metacognitive
judgment and the denominator neglect question were presented on the
same page and we could not control for differences in reading times (e.g.,
there was a paragraph describing the clinical trials required for the initial
judgment, see Appendix).
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cal trial of a drug designed to reduce heart attack in which
“. . . 80 out of 800 people who did not take the drug died
after a heart attack, compared to 16 out of 100 people who
took the drug”. We then asked participants “How help-
ful was this drug” on a 7 point scale. Those participants
who accurately estimated the ratios would find that 10%
of those who did not take the drug died, compared to 16%
of those who did take the drug. Thus, the drug was not
effective. We hypothesized that less numerate participants
who focused on factors like the absolute number of pa-
tients who died (16 died if they took the drug versus 80
died if they didn’t take the drug) would come to a dif-
ferent, non-normative conclusion (i.e., show denominator
neglect bias). Next we asked all participants how con-
fident they were in their previous helpfulness judgment,
using a 7 point scale where 1 indicated not at all confi-
dent and 7 indicated very confident (see Appendix A and
B for exact materials). We hypothesized that accuracy and
confidence should have a non-linear relationship. Those
who do not effectively self-monitor would tend to be very
confident in their inaccurate judgments (i.e., unskilled and
unaware phenomena; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dun-
ning, & Kruger, 2008). However, as the quality of one’s
metacognitive self-assessment increased so too should ac-
curacy (i.e., a curvilinear relationship). We further hypoth-
esized that the relationship between scores on the Berlin
Numeracy Test and accuracy would be partially mediated
by people’s ability to accurately assess their own judgment
(i.e., degree of overconfidence).
Following all performance tasks, participants were pre-
sented with a demographics questionnaire, including ques-
tions on their sex, age, education, and professional field.
Participants were presented with information about their
numeracy score and their relative estimated risk literacy
(see RiskLiteracy.org for examples). Finally, participants
were thanked and debriefed.
2.3 Results
Our sample from de Volkskrant showed a much higher av-
erage score on the Berlin Numeracy Test than other past
samples of college educated participants, including sam-
ples of practicing surgeons in the EU (Figure 1). The high
scores were anticipated because participants were (a) read-
ing newspaper articles about statistics for leisure, (b) moti-
vated to log on and test their numeracy skill, and (c) highly
educated (72% of the participants reported earning at least
one college degree and 50% reported having more than
one, see Table 1). Overall 61% of the sample answered
all questions correctly and 76% scored above the median
on BNT test (see Figure 1). Also, consistent with previous
findings, men (t (3960) = 5.9, p = .001) and younger adults
(t (3620) = 6.11, p = .001) tended to score slightly higher
on the BNT than women and older adults.
Figure 1: Percentage of participants at each level of nu-
meracy as measured by the Berlin Numeracy Test. The
four levels represent estimated quartile norms for educated



























A linear regression was used to examine the relation be-
tween the BNT and overall score on all three financial
choices (i.e., normative accuracy). Regression indicated
that BNT was a moderate sized, significant single predic-
tor of normatively superior financial decisions (F (1, 3986)
= 282.7, β = .26, p < .001, R2 = .07—β represents the
standardized regression weight). Individuals who scored
higher on the BNT made more normatively superior deci-
sions than those with lower BNT scores (see Figure 2).
A significant positive relationship was observed be-
tween education and BNT (r (3988) = .21, p =.0001) and
between education and performance (r (3988) = .16, p =
.0001). To examine further the role of education and other
potentially influential variables, we constructed a series of
hierarchical linear regression models with gender and age
(model 1), education (model 2), and BNT (model 3) as
predictors of overall financial decisions. The full model
(model 3) significantly predicted performance on the three
financial decisions (R2 = .11, F (4, 3655) = 116.53, p <
.001). The BNT remained a moderately sized predictor of
superior financial choices with education, age, and gender
included (R2change = .04, β = .20) (see Table 2).11
We recorded the time each participant spent on the web-
page with the financial decisions as a rough proxy for over-
11When only age and gender, not education, were included along with
BNT, the coefficient for BNT was little changed (R2 = .10, R2change = .05,
β = .23, p < .001).
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Table 2: Hierarchical regression predicting performance









Model 1 0.23 0.05 0.05 100.57∗∗
Gender −0.23∗∗
Age −0.09∗∗









Note: ∗∗ p < .001.
all deliberation during risky decision making. We found
a positive relationship between decision latency and the
BNT (r (3988) = .074, p < .001), between decision la-
tency and superior financial decisions including all three
decisions in aggregate (r (3988) = .068, p < .001) and be-
tween BNT and superior financial decision (r (3988) = .26,
p < .001). A mediation model was developed (Preacher &
Hayes, 2004). The direct effects of BNT on performance
(path c) and the indirect effects of BNT on performance
via decision latency (i.e., deliberation) are presented in
Figure 3. Results reveal significant and positive direct ef-
fects (path a) of the BNT on latency (B = .09, se = .01, p
< .001), and of latency (path b) on superior decision mak-
ing (B = .09, se = .02, p < .001). An examination of the
specific indirect effects (path c’) indicates that the relation-
ship between the BNT and superior decision making was
partially mediated by decision latency (B = .208, SE = .01,
p < .001; Sobel test value z = 4.04, p < .001). Note that,
although the relationship is significant, the magnitude is
modest and smaller than in past studies. We speculate the
difference reflects psychometric limits of our rough deci-
sion latency assessment (i.e., total website page viewing
time for only three choices) as well as restriction of range
in our very highly educated sample.
2.3.2 Financial lotteries
Regression was used to examine performance on the two
financial lottery questions. The BNT was related to su-
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents at each level of the



























perior risky decision making in the gain frame (r (3988)
= .17, p =.001) and in the loss frame (r (3988) = −.17,
p < .001).12 Linear regression indicated that BNT pre-
dicted overall performance on combined (gain and loss)
decisions (R2 = .05, F (1, 3986) = 207.4, β = −.22, p <
.001). To compare predictive power relative to other po-
tentially influential variables, we constructed hierarchical
linear regression models with gender and age (model 1),
education (model 2), and BNT (model 3) as predictors of
overall risky lottery decisions. The BNT coefficient was
largely unchanged when age, gender and education were
included (β = −.18, p < .001).
2.3.3 Intertemporal choice
For the intertemporal time preference question 87% of the
total sample made normatively superior choices (i.e., pre-
ferred C3800 next month rather than C3400 this month).
Linear regression indicated BNT was a significant predic-
tor of time preferences (R2 = .03, F (1, 3986) = 115.6, β =
.17, p < .001).13 BNT remained a predictor for intertempo-
ral choices when age, gender, and education were included
in a linear regression (β = .12, p < .001).
12We also performed a non-parametric chi-square test to examine the
relationship between numeracy and framing effects; we found that highly
numerate participants selected more normatively superior decisions for
gains (52% vs 39%, χ(1) 46.1, p <.0001) and for losses (82% vs 68%, χ
(1) 75.7, p < .0001) as compared to less numerate participants.
13We also conducted non-parametric chi-square test; results indicated
that highly numerate participants made more patient choices (90% vs
79%, χ (1) 72.4, p <.0001) as compared to less numerate participants.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2014 Numeracy and biases in the highly educated 22
Figure 3: Deliberation (i.e., decision latency) partially me-
diated the relationship between the BNT and superior fi-
nancial decision making. The Sobel test of mediation was
significant, z = 4.04, p < .0001. Unstandardized path co-
efficients are shown with standard errors in parenthesis.
Delibration
BNT Performance
.09 (.01)  .09 (.02)
  c = .22 (.01)
  c'= .208 (.01)
2.3.4 Medical judgment
Seventy four percent of the total sample made normative
judgments on the medical judgment task.14 Linear regres-
sion indicated that the BNT was a significant single pre-
dictor of accuracy of the medical judgments (R2 = .04, F
(1, 3986) = 180.86, β = .21, p < .001). Hierarchical linear
regression models examined potentially influential vari-
ables of age and gender (model 1), education (model 2),
and BNT (model 3). The BNT coefficient was essentially
unaffected by the inclusion of these variables (R2 change =
.034, β = .19, p < .001; see Table 3).
2.3.5 Confidence
We analyzed the relationship between the BNT, medi-
cal judgment accuracy, and confidence in judgment. We
found a positive relationship between the BNT and confi-
dence (r (3988) = .09, p < .001). We also found a positive
relationship between confidence and accuracy of medical
judgments (r (3988) = .26, p < .0001). Curve estimation
indicated that the relationship between confidence and ac-
curacy was curvilinear and that a quadratic model fit better
than the linear model (R2 for quadratic = .12, R2 for lin-
ear = .07, R2change = .05). Figure 4 shows the best fitting
models. Note that both the decrease in confidence as ac-
curacy increased from 1 to 4 and the increase as accuracy
increased from 4 to 7 were highly significant (p < .001).
This result suggests the presence of an unskilled and un-
aware type effect (i.e., participants were highly overcon-
fident at low levels of accuracy yet relatively well cal-
ibrated at higher levels of accuracy). As numeracy in-
14Choosing 1 on a 7-point scale, in which 7 means that the drug is very
effective and 1 means drug is not effective.
Table 3: Hierarchical regression predicting performance









Model 1 0.022 0 0 0.89
Gender −0.02
Age −0.002









Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .001.
creased, the total number of participants with perfect cali-
bration also increased, while the proportion of participants
who were overconfident decreased (Table 4). We also
found that the strength of the relationship between con-
fidence and accuracy increased at higher levels of numer-
acy, while the strength of the curvilinear model decreased,
as did the difference between the linear and curvilinear
models (Table 4). These results suggest that participants
who are more numerate also tend to have better judgment
calibration (e.g., less overconfidence). Path analysis in-
dicated that confidence partially mediated the relationship
between BNT and accuracy (Table 5).
2.4 Study 1 discussion
Taken together the results of Study 1 indicate that even
in very highly educated and highly numerate commu-
nity samples (Table 6) the Berlin Numeracy Test is a ro-
bust predictor of paradigmatic financial and medical judg-
ment and decision making. Results also indicate that the
numeracy test predicts superior performance in part be-
cause it predicts differences in metacognitive processes,
including differences in deliberation (as evidenced by de-
cision latencies) and differences in the quality of one’s
self-assessment (as evidenced by differences in overcon-
fidence).
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Table 4: Proportion of participants who had perfect cali-
bration or were overconfident at each level of numeracy.
Results of accuracy regressed on confidence at each level


















BNT=1 .48 .27 0.03∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.16
BNT=2 .56 .21 0.07∗∗ 0.18∗∗ −0.11
BNT=3 .61 .15 0.05∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.10
BNT=4 .65 .08 0.08∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.05
Note: ∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .001.
Table 5: Mediation through MEDCURVE (Hayes &









2.3 (–1 SD) .079 .014 .053–.110
3.3 (Mean) .084 .016 .055–.115
4.3 (+1 SD) .088 .018 .057–.120
Note: The table displays results of a medcurve
meditational analysis at the mean BNT score and
at BNT scores +/– 1 standard deviation from the
mean. Indirect effects (i.e., mediation) of the BNT-
to-performance relation via confidence judgments are
shown to be significant with ab indirect effect coeffi-
cients and confidence intervals that do not include zero
points.
3 Study 2: Data from the Dutch
Grand National Numeracy Survey
In Study 2 we sought to extend results from Study 1 by
comparing the predictive performance of the Berlin Nu-
meracy Test with another commonly used brief numeracy




Data were collected in Holland via an online link included
as part of Dutch Grand National Numeracy Survey and
associated outreach efforts. The data included 1418 par-
Figure 4: Curvilinear relationship between accuracy and
confidence. High levels of overconfidence at low levels
of accuracy (i.e., lower numbers on the x-axis) become
more calibrated at higher levels of accuracy. Circle areas
represents the proportion of respondents in each response
category.














ticipants with a mean age of 44 years (SD = 15). Fifty
two percent of the sample was male. Thirty percent of the
sample had at least one advanced graduate degree.
3.1.2 Material and procedure
All materials and procedures in Study 2 were identical to
those used in Study 1 except that we included the Schwartz
et al.’s (1997) three item numeracy test immediately before
the adaptive Berlin Numeracy Test items.
3.2 Results and discussion
About 38% of the sample scored perfectly on the Berlin
Numeracy Test (a score of 4) and 57% of the sample
scored above the median point on the BNT (see Figure
5). This suggests that the Study 2 sample was more nu-
merate than the educated samples used to norm the Berlin
Numeracy Test yet was considerably less numerate than
the sample from Study 1 (76% of which were above the
median; see Figure 1).
Analyses followed those presented in Study 1. Linear
regression indicated that the BNT predicted superior per-
formance on combined financial decision tasks (β = .24;
R2 = .06, F (1, 1417) = 83.88, p < .001), medical judg-
ments (β = .22; R2 = .05, F (1, 1417) = 72.18, p < .001),
and confidence judgments (β = .23; R2 = .053, F (1, 1417)
= 79.76, p < .001). A series of sets of hierarchical linear
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Table 6: Overall performance on medical judgments, fi-







Banking/Finance 139 0.85 0.86 0.79
Statistics/Math. 256 0.90 0.90 0.92
Computer/Eng. 681 0.91 0.89 0.87
Humanities/Art 212 0.89 0.83 0.80
Medicine/Health 459 0.91 0.84 0.83
Mgmt./Admin. 467 0.90 0.84 0.81
Cust. services 67 0.86 0.83 0.74
Students 306 0.88 0.84 0.84
Others 1430 0.89 0.84 0.80
regression models with gender and age (model 1), educa-
tion (model 2), and BNT (model 3) as predictors of finan-
cial decision were used to estimate independent contribu-
tions of each factor. In a model including age, gender, and
education, the BNT provided unique predictive power for
financial decisions (R2change = .03, β= .18, p < .001)15 (see
Table 7). In a model including age, gender and education
the BNT was also a good predictor of superior medical
judgments (R2change = .025, β = .17, p < .001) and confi-
dence judgment (R2 change = .036, β = .20, p < .001; see
Tables 8 and 9 for full model). As in Study 1, the BNT
coefficient was reduced only a little by the addition of the
other predictors.
We again found a curvilinear relationship between ac-
curacy of medical judgments and confidence (R2 for
quadratic = .15, as compared to R2 for linear = .08, R2change
= .074). As numeracy increased, the total number of
participants with perfect calibration also increased, while
the proportion of participants who were overconfident de-
creased (Table 10). We also found that the strength of the
relationship between confidence and accuracy tended to
increase at higher levels of numeracy, while the strength
of the curvilinear model tended to decrease, as did the dif-
ference between the linear and curvilinear models (Table
10). These results suggest that participants who are more
numerate also tend to be better at assessing the accuracy of
their judgments (e.g., less overconfidence). Path analysis
indicated that confidence partially mediated the relation-
ship between BNT and accuracy.
We analyzed the relationship between decision latency,
the BNT, and superior financial decisions as in Study 1.
15We also constructed hierarchical linear regression models without
entering the education variable into the model (gender and age [model
1] and BNT [model 2]). Excluding education, we found that the model
was still a relatively good predictor of superior performance (R2 = .09, R
change = .035, p < .001; β = .19).
Table 7: Hierarchical regression predicting performance









Model 1 0.23 0.05 0.05 34.89∗∗
Gender −0.22∗∗
Age −0.07∗









Note: ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .001.
We found that time spent on financial decisions was pos-
itively related to performance on financial decisions (β =
.09, p = .001). However, the relation between BNT and
time was not quite significant (β = .05, p = .08), and our
mediational analysis indicated a non-significant trend to-
ward partial mediation (Sobel test of mediation, z = 1.43, p
= .15). We speculate that this reflects the same psychome-
tric limitations noted in Study 1 (i.e., limited webpage de-
cision latency assessment sensitivity, restriction of range).
We note that partial mediation has been seen in other stud-
ies (e.g., Study 1, Barton, Cokely, Galesic, Koehler, &
Haas, 2009; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Woller-Carter et al.,
2012).
3.3 Psychometric analysis
Regression analysis indicated the Schwartz et al.’s (1997)
test was a robust single predictor of financial decisions (β
= .20; R2 = .04, F (1, 1417) = 56.99, p < .001) and medi-
cal judgments (β = .17; R2 = .03, F (1, 1417) = 40.04, p <
.001). Additional analyses indicated that the BNT doubled
the unique predictive power of the Schwartz et al.’s (1997)
test for both superior financial and medical decisions (Ta-
ble 11). A hierarchical linear regression examined the po-
tential additive effects with models of BNT (model 1) and
BNT and Schwartz et al.’s (1997) (model 2). Adding the
Schwartz et al.’s (1996) test to the BNT provided a modest
significant improvement in the predictive power for com-
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Table 8: Hierarchical regression predicting performance









Model 1 0.07 0.005 0.005 3.13∗
Gender −0.04
Age −0.06∗









Note: ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .001.
bined financial decisions (R2change = .015, β = .13) and for
medical judgments (R2change = .01, β = .10; see Table 13).
Following Cokely et al. (2012) we combined the BNT and
Schwartz et al.’s (1997) measures together to generate a
composite BNT-S score (see Figure 6). As would be ex-
pected, the BNT-S score showed considerable skew (Fig-
ure 6) yet was a robust predictor of superior financial de-
cisions (β = .27; R2 = .07, F (1, 1417) = 108.03, p < .001),
and medical judgments (β = .24; R2 = .06, F (1, 1417) =
86.39, p < .001).
4 General discussion
In two large studies conducted with very highly educated
samples, the Berlin Numeracy Test was found to be a ro-
bust independent predictor of superior judgment and deci-
sion making across risky decisions, temporal discounting,
class-inclusion illusions (i.e., denominator neglect), and
metacognitive judgments (median unique β = .19). The
Berlin Numeracy Test doubled the predictive power of the
well-established test by Schwartz and colleagues (1997),
predicting performance in samples with numeracy scores
that were notably higher than those observed in surgeons
and medical students (Garcia-Retamero et al., in press,
2014). To put the current observed predictive strength into
perspective, the link between the single predictor BNT and
overall task performance is stronger than estimates of the
link between gender and observed risk-taking behavior.
Table 9: Hierarchical regression predicting performance









Model 1 0.13 0.02 0.02 11.67∗∗
Gender −0.13∗∗
Age −0.01









Note: ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .001.
The observed predictive power is about as strong as the
meta-analytic estimate of the effect of ibuprofen on pain
reduction (Meyer et al., 2001; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner,
Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). It is noteworthy that the rela-
tionship was observed despite conditions of extreme re-
striction of range (i.e., the use of very highly educated
samples) and non-ideal measurement conditions (e.g., few
criteria). The current findings suggest that the predic-
tive power of numeracy should tend to be significantly
stronger in more diverse samples (e.g., in the general pop-
ulation, among college students), as found in other studies
(Cokely et al., 2009, 2012). The current results also pro-
vide some of the first evidence that among very highly nu-
merate participants, metacognitive processes continue to
partially drive the ability-to-performance relationship (i.e.,
deliberation and confidence). These results converge with
others indicating that the link between numeracy and su-
perior judgment and decision making is not simply a func-
tion of differences in “doing the math”.
4.1 Numeracy and metacognition
As detailed in the introduction, the theoretical construct
of numeracy is multifactorial including (1) a practical un-
derstanding of numbers and mathematical procedures, and
(2) the skills necessary for effective problem solving and
self-regulated learning (e.g., metacognition and thinking
about thinking; Flavell, 1979; Garofalo & Lester, 1985;
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Table 10: Proportion of participants who had perfect cal-
ibration or were overconfident at each level of numeracy.
Results of accuracy regressed on confidence at each level


















BNT=1 .32 .29 0.04∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.18
BNT=2 .45 .26 0.07∗∗ 0.18∗∗ −0.11
BNT=3 .56 .16 0.14∗∗ 0.30∗∗ −0.16
BNT=4 .62 .16 0.04∗∗ 0.11∗∗ −0.07
Note: ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .001.
Table 11: Unique predictive power of the two numeracy
tests for predicting risky decisions. Standardized beta co-
efficients presented.
Financial decisions Medical judgments
BNT .19∗∗ .19∗∗
Schwartz .13∗∗ .10∗∗
Note: ∗∗ p < .001.
Lucangeli & Cornoldi, 1997; see also Dunlosky & Met-
calfe, 2009). Numeracy tests appear to predict a wide
range of behavior because they simultaneously assess both
mathematical knowledge and the metacognitive processes
involved in effective thinking (Halpern, 1998; Schoenfeld,
1992; Schraw, 1998; but for related theory in decision
making see Baron, 1985, 2008; Baron, Badgio, & Gask-
ins, 1986; Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich, West, & Toplak,
2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, in press a, in press
b). For example, in the current studies, we observed links
between numeracy, confidence, deliberation, and superior
performance. Because most participants were highly nu-
merate, the differences in performance do not likely re-
flect differences in the availability of requisite mathemat-
ical skills. Nearly all participants were numerate enough
to accurately calculate all expected values, discount rates,
and relative proportions. Differences are also unlikely
to reflect variation in levels of short-term motivation or
task goals, as all participants volunteered and logged-on
so they could test their numeracy. Rather than differ-
ences in goals, motivation, or minimum mathematical un-
derstanding, the observed performance differences appear
to be more metacognitive in nature.16 Those participants
16Appropriate cognitive representations, rather than explicit math
skills, can also play a role in superior performance, as can be seen with
Figure 5: Levels of numeracy in a Dutch community sam-





































who had a more accurate subjective sense of their judg-
ment performance (i.e., estimated confidence) and those
who tended to spend more time deliberating during de-
cision making tended to perform better. While there are
likely many other important metacognitive and numeracy-
related skills at work (Peters, 2012; Peters, Meilleur, &
Tompkins, in press; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna et al.,
2009), the current data accord with previous research sug-
gesting that deliberation and accurate self-monitoring of-
ten play central roles in domain-general superior judgment
and decision making.17
4.2 Confidence and deliberation
The relationship between confidence and superior judg-
ment and decision making is well-established (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007), as are the relations between confi-
dence, numeracy, and intelligence (Stankov, 2000). Re-
search indicates that subjective estimates of confidence
tends to derive from two factors—i.e., self-consistency
(e.g., how reliably and quickly a judgment comes to mind)
the influence of simple visual aids that eliminate large performance dif-
ferences between more and less numerate participants (Garcia-Retamero
& Cokely, 2011, 2013, in press; see also Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kruz-
Mickle, Schwartz, Woloshin, 2007, and Peters et al., in press).
17There are many theories about the causal mechanisms that give rise
to the link between domain-general abilities and superior performance,
as well as many compelling critiques of those theories (Baron, 1985;
Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Reyna at al., 2009; Stanovich & West, 2000,
2008).
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Table 12: Model comparison using BNT and Schwartz et







Model 1 0.24 0.06 0.06 83.9∗∗
BNT 0.24∗∗




Model 1 0.22 0.05 0.05 72.2∗∗
BNT 0.22∗∗
Model 2 0.24 0.06 0.01 13.7∗∗
BNT 0.19∗∗
Schwartz 0.10∗∗
Note: ∗∗ p < .001.
and the breadth of information that comes to mind (Koriat,
2012; see also Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010).
Interestingly, although many studies treat confidence as
a linear variable, here the relationship between confidence
and performance was found to be curvilinear, resulting in
an “unskilled and unaware” effect (Ehrlinger & Dunning,
2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008).
Our confidence results accord with a variety of factor-
analytic studies indicating that confidence self-assessment
can operate as a domain-general skill that will be cor-
related with but also an independent predictor of gen-
eral abilities, personality traits, and cognitive performance
(Baker, 2010; Schraw, 2010; Stankov, 2000; Stankov &
Lee, 2008). These results also accord with metacognitive
theory suggesting confidence tends to be useful specifi-
cally because it is instrumental in self-regulation—i.e., the
monitoring and control of cognition (Nelson & Narens,
1990; see also Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). For example,
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) describe how confidence ac-
cumulates and then is checked against a criterion in or-
der to decide what type of information will be output in
a memory task. Related studies of factors like “feeling
of correctness” show that confidence-type judgments pre-
dict differences in information search and elaboration. In
addition to predicting judgments about the correctness of
one’s answer, one’s feeling of correctness tends to be re-
lated to “rethinking” times and the likelihood of changing
one’s initial answer during reasoning (Thompson, Prowse
Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). These studies and others
Figure 6: Levels of numeracy in a Dutch community sam-
ple using Schwartz et al.’s (1997) and BNT measures com-
bined (n = 1418).




































suggest that factors related to how one uses and assesses
confidence may often be essential components determin-
ing the extent to which one deliberates during judgment
and decision making (e.g., how much evidence does one
require in order to feel confident in one’s decision?).
The links between deliberation and various types of
superior cognitive performance are also well-established.
Deliberation is related to and can even cause differences
in domain general cognitive abilities, such as intelli-
gence and attentional control (Baron, 1978, 1985; Cokely,
Kelley, & Gilchrist, 2006; Hertzog & Robinson, 2005;
Stanovich, 2012). Consistent with the current results, de-
liberation is thought to be an essential component of ratio-
nal thinking (e.g., reflectiveness and active open-minded
thinking; Baron, 1985, 2008; Baron et al., 1986). Unfortu-
nately, the current data do not provide process-level details
about the content of deliberation in the current study.
Previous cognitive process tracing studies suggest that
the observed differences in deliberation are not likely to
result from differences in normative decision strategies.18
Consider the protocol analysis conducted by Cokely and
Kelley (2009) examining deliberative processes in sim-
ple risky lotteries. Although a pilot study indicated that
most college students could perform the required math
(e.g., “what is 3% of 7000”), less than 5% of their sample
calculated expected value during decision making. Anal-
18For related experimental evidence see the study by Peters et al.
(2006) showing that, while numeracy is related to superior performance,
it is also predictably related to biases, reflecting the influence of heuristic
processes (e.g., influenced by affective precision).
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yses of formal decision models, reaction times, and ret-
rospective memory reports indicated that the ability-to-
performance relationship was fully mediated by large dif-
ferences in heuristic-based deliberation and elaborative
processing (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; see also Pachur &
Galesic, 2013). Better risky decision making followed
from differences in how participants thought about the de-
cision (e.g., meaning-oriented elaborative processes such
as imagining how the changes in wealth could affect one’s
life and how that might feel in contrast to others who
treated the task as if it was just a game of chance; see also
Reyna et al., 2009). Better risky decision making also fol-
lowed from differences in how much participants thought
about the decision (e.g., elaborating multiple reasons for
each decision, transforming probabilities, and reframing
outcomes). Similar results have been found in other pro-
tocol analyses, eye-tracking studies, and memory analyses
used to examine some medical and economic judgments
and decisions (Barton et al., 2009; Woller-Carter et al.,
2012). Protocol analysis also suggests that, during move
selection in chess, the systematic use of more deliberation
tends to be associated with large performance advantages
for both novices and experts (Moxley, Ericsson, Charness,
& Krampe, 2012; see also Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely,
2007).
We suggest that links between deliberation, confidence,
and performance likely reflect a host of early selec-
tion metacognitive processes (Cokely & Kelley, 2009).
Research shows that individuals who score higher on
domain-general cognitive ability measures often spend
more time preparing for tasks and also more elaborately
process information, deliberatively building richer cogni-
tive representations in long-term memory in order to pro-
vide better monitoring and control during subsequent task
performance (Baron, 1978, 1985; Cokely & Kelley, 2009;
Cokely et al., 2006; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Hertzog
& Robinson, 2005; Sternberg, 1977; Vigneau, Caissie, &
Bors, 2005). As an analogy, in manufacturing one can im-
prove the quality of goods sent to market by (a) improving
inputs (e.g., higher quality materials and plans), (b) im-
proving outputs (e.g., careful inspection and repair), or (c)
doing both. In the metacognition literature these quality
control efforts are referred to in terms of (a) early selec-
tion versus (b) late correction processes (Jacoby, Kelley,
& McElree, 1999; Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes,
2005). Late correction processes attempt to detect and re-
pair (e.g., System 2) the output of faulty automatic pro-
cesses (e.g., System 1), such as biased intuitions. In con-
trast, early selection uses controlled processing (e.g., Sys-
tem 2) to generate goals, strategies, and mental contexts
that qualitatively alter the output of automatic processes
(e.g., System 1) before biased intuitions are generated
(e.g., approaching the task more carefully).
To the extent that early selection metacognitive pro-
cesses are recruited, they involve deliberation and elab-
orative encoding (e.g., contextualizing the problem by
deeply thinking about the various aspects of the problem
and their potential implications). This elaborative encod-
ing causes information in working memory to be more
robustly stored and represented in long-term memory,
freeing-up limited attentional resources and creating more
enduring and detailed problem representations (Cokely et
al., 2006; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Such representations
may be similar in some important respects to those de-
scribed in Fuzzy-Trace Theory as gist-based representa-
tions (e.g., one may use elaborative processing to build a
more comprehensive intuitive representation). Ultimately,
confidence calibration can be improved because some bi-
ased intuitions are never experienced and because more
detailed representations provide more diagnostic cues for
accurate cognitive monitoring (i.e., better quality evidence
for monitoring; see Mitchum & Kelley, 2010). Note, how-
ever, that mere deliberation does not guarantee improved
performance. Performance incentives that increase delib-
eration often fail to improve calibration or performance
because participants tend to search for evidence that con-
firms their current beliefs (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fis-
chhoff, 1980; see also Nickerson, 1998).19 Improving
calibration typically requires either changing task struc-
tures or training with individualized feedback. This type
of training can lead to nearly perfect calibration. How-
ever, confidence will tend to be highly domain specific
unless training also focuses on transferable metacognitive
skills (e.g., practice using metacognitive heuristics such as
searching for disconfirming evidence; Arkes, 1991).
4.3 Conclusions
Cognitive skills and abilities generalize only to the extent
that similar elements of the skills are present on train-
ing and transfer tasks. Transfer requires shared elements
(Thorndick & Woodworth, 1901; see also Blume, Ford,
Baldwin, Huang, 2010). Many skills are highly domain-
specific and so they are unrelated to performance outside a
narrow band of expertise (e.g., surgical skill is not related
to managerial decision making; Ericsson, Charness, Fel-
tovich, & Hoffman, 2006; Ericsson et al., 2007). Numer-
acy is different. In the modern world, mathematical con-
cepts are ubiquitous: Numeracy is an essential component
of risk literacy and scientific thinking (Bruine de Bruin &
Bostrom, in press; Cokely et al., 2012; Gigerenzer 2002;
2012). However, consistent with a large body of data,
the current results suggest that numeracy tests don’t sim-
ply predict use of abstract mathematics or normative deci-
sion strategies. Beyond the essential contributions of one’s
19See Cokely and Kelley (2009) for a more detailed discussion of
deliberative early selection versus late correction cognitive control pro-
cesses.
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mathematical competence, numeracy tests predict supe-
rior judgment and decision making because they assess
(i) heuristic-based deliberation and metacognition (Cokely
& Kelley, 2009; Cokely et al., 2012; see also Stanovich,
2012; reflectiveness, Baron, 1985), (ii) affective numer-
ical intuition (Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006; Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, MacGregor, 2002), and (iii) meaning-
ful intuitive understanding (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991,
2005a; Reyna et al., 2009). More research is needed to in-
vestigate and model training and transfer across numeracy,
metacognition, and decision tasks. For example: When
does training numeracy improve metacognition? Why
does training metacognition improve numeracy? What
types of numeracy and metacognitive training improve de-
cision making? To the extent that we develop a higher-
fidelity understanding of underlying shared elements, we
may be able to more efficiently reduce and anticipate non-
adaptive judgment and decision making biases (e.g., intel-
ligent tutoring systems, interactive risk communications).
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Appendix A: Material
Financial decision tasks
Which option do you prefer?
a) C3400 This month b) C3800 next month
Which option do you prefer?
a) C100 for sure b) 60% chance of C250
Which option do you prefer?
a) 75% chance to lose C200 b) C100 surely lose
Medical and metacognitive judgment task
The new drug BENOFRENO, the risk of death from a
heart attack reduced for people with high cholesterol. A
study with 900 with high cholesterol showed that 80 of
the 800 people who have not taken the drug deceased after
a heart attack, compared with 16 of the 100 people who
have taken the drug.
1.How beneficial was the Benofreno?
Not beneficial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very beneficial
2. How confident are you about your decision?
Not sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very sure
4.3.1 Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT) four questions
(used in adaptive format)
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members
of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the choir 100
are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the
choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a randomly
drawn man is a member of the choir?
Please indicate the probability in percent.
2. Imagine we are throwing a Five-sided die 50 times.
On average, out of these 50 throws how many times would
this Five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?
3. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The
probability that the die shows a 6 is twice as high as the
probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out
of these 70 throws how many times would the die show
the number 6?
4. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown
and 30% white. A red mushroom is poisonous with a prob-
ability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous
with a probability of 5%. What is the probability that a
poisonous mushroom in the forest is red?
4.3.2 Schwartz three numeracy questions
1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is
your best guess about how many times the coin would
come up heads in 1,000 flips?
2. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chance of winning a $10
prize is 1%. What is your best guess about how many
people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a
single ticket to Big Bucks?
3. In ACME Publishing Sweepstakes, the chance of win-
ning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME
Publishing Sweepstakes win a car?
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Appendix B: Screen shots of the decision tasks as presented in the experiment
